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Abstract
Background: The Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) associated coronavirus has been imported via travelers
into multiple countries around the world. In order to support risk assessment practice, the present study aimed to
devise a novel statistical model to quantify the country-level risk of experiencing an importation of MERS case.
Methods: We analyzed the arrival time of each reported MERS importation around the world, i.e., the date on
which imported cases entered a specific country, which was modeled as a dependent variable in our analysis. We
also used openly accessible data including the airline transportation network to parameterize a hazard-based risk
prediction model. The hazard was assumed to follow an inverse function of the effective distance (i.e., the minimum
effective length of a path from origin to destination), which was calculated from the airline transportation data, from
Saudi Arabia to each country. Both country-specific religion and the incidence data of MERS in Saudi Arabia were used
to improve our model prediction.
Results: Our estimates of the risk of MERS importation appeared to be right skewed, which facilitated the visual
identification of countries at highest risk of MERS importations in the right tail of the distribution. The simplest model
that relied solely on the effective distance yielded the best predictive performance (Area under the curve (AUC) = 0.
943) with 100 % sensitivity and 79.6 % specificity. Out of the 30 countries estimated to be at highest risk of MERS case
importation, 17 countries (56.7 %) have already reported at least one importation of MERS. Although model fit
measured by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was improved by including country-specific religion (i.e. Muslim
majority country), the predictive performance as measured by AUC was not improved after accounting for
this covariate.
Conclusions: Our relatively simple statistical model based on the effective distance derived from the airline
transportation network data was found to help predicting the risk of importing MERS at the country level.
The successful application of the effective distance model to predict MERS importations, particularly when
computationally intensive large-scale transmission models may not be immediately applicable could have
been benefited from the particularly low transmissibility of the MERS coronavirus.
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Background
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a viral
infectious disease caused by the MERS associated
coronavirus (MERS-CoV), which was first identified in
September 2012. Infections with this virus have been
reported from countries in the Middle East where drom-
edary camels have been found to be an important reser-
voir of the coronavirus. The case fatality ratio of MERS
among confirmed cases has been estimated at about
40 % [1]. Human-to-human transmission has been facili-
tated in healthcare settings [2] with the contribution of
hospital-based transmission of MERS estimated at about
80 % using an epidemic model [3]. The pandemic risk
that MERS poses is limited by the fact that R0 (the basic
reproduction number, i.e., the average number of
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secondary cases produced by a single primary case) is
estimated at below 1 and that MERS outbreaks have
been greatly confined to the healthcare environment
until now [4, 5]. Antibodies against MERS-CoV have
been found among both dromedary camel populations
and camel-exposed humans in Saudi Arabia and other
countries of the Middle East [6, 7], which have often
been the source of multiple MERS case importations
around the world. As highlighted by the recent MERS
outbreak in the Republic of Korea since May 2015 [8, 9]
together with one case importation with no secondary
cases into Thailand in June 2015 [10], the risk for global
spread of MERS is sufficiently serious to warrant the
need to find ways to assess the risk of importing MERS
case around the world, because those single importa-
tions could potentially escalate into regional outbreaks
that could, in turn, lead to a serious damage to eco-
nomic and public health activities [11].
To support risk assessment practice on potential
MERS outbreaks, it could be helpful to pre-emptively
characterize the risk of importing MERS case across
countries. By estimating the risk of MERS importations,
one can comparatively understand the country-specific
risk, and such understanding may help raise situation
awareness among the general public, facilitating prevent-
ive action planning. In this context, a metapopulation
epidemic model that uses the airline transportation net-
work has been employed for predicting the global spread
of various emerging infectious diseases, including severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the influenza pan-
demic H1N1-2009 and Ebola virus disease [12–14].
These transmission models have not only helped study
epidemic scenarios but also estimated the effectiveness
of specific countermeasures targeting travelers, e.g.,
entry and exit screenings and travel restrictions [15, 16].
While the metapopulation epidemic model is simple in
its structure, epidemic forecasting by fitting the model
to empirical data entails optimization procedures that
are often computationally intensive. Moreover, while a
few published studies have already investigated the risk
of MERS associated with mass gatherings in Saudi
Arabia [17, 18], the distribution of secondary cases per
single primary case is highly over-dispersed [4, 11] with
the overall R0 falling below 1. Hence, the metapopula-
tion type models that have been used to evaluate epi-
demics of communicable diseases (e.g., R0 > 1) may not
be directly and immediately applied to model the global
spread of MERS.
While metapopulation models are useful for capturing
various aspects of global transmission dynamics, a sim-
ple yet tractable prediction model to carry out fast risk
assessment by public health authorities is needed. Such
a tool might just quantify the basic information, e.g. (i)
the percentage of importing MERS case at a point in
time and (ii) when the importation of MERS case is ex-
pected. The present study aims to devise and apply a
novel statistical model to predict the risk of MERS case
importations by country. We assess the predictive per-
formance of our approach and use it to identify coun-
tries at high risk of MERS importations.
Methods
Empirical datasets
In order to quantify our statistical model, we used data
on imported laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS as of
26 June 2015 (the latest date on which our data analysis
was conducted), especially focusing on the date on
which the first diagnosed case arrived in each importing
country. The date of entry of imported MERS cases is
hereafter referred to as the arrival time and the corre-
sponding information was retrieved from secondary data
sources including the European Centre for Disease Pre-
vention and Control (ECDC) [19] and the World Health
Organization [20]. Since it was sometimes difficult to de-
termine if a case was the result of an importation event
instead of local transmission (e.g., spillover event or ex-
posure to an undiagnosed case), original case reports
were also tracked, especially among diagnosed cases in
Middle East countries [21–23]. Qatar and the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia were excluded from countries at risk of
importation, because indigenous cases with the history
of exposure to dromedary camels have been recurrently
reported after the identification of the first case in 2012.
In addition to the arrival time of MERS case importa-
tions; three pieces of further information were retrieved.
First, weekly incident counts of MERS in Saudi Arabia
[24] were used to mirror the force of infection among
travelers. Second, the number of flight routes between
pairs of countries was obtained from the airline trans-
portation network data. The total number of flight
routes between each pair of countries has an approxi-
mate dimension of 3 times 4,600 (or with 230 nodes and
4,600 edges) and was obtained from the Global Flights
Network [25] derived from the OpenFlights database as
on 10 November 2014 [26]. Third, dichotomous data to
identify the major religion of each country which is in
common with Saudi Arabia and Qatar was obtained
from the literature [27]: a country in which more than
30 % of the population is Muslim was defined as a
Muslim majority country.
Building risk models
Here we describe the proposed model aimed to predict
the risk of importation in each country. Let Fj,t be the
cumulative distribution function representing the prob-
ability that MERS has already been imported to country
j by discrete day t. The day t = 0 corresponds to the date
of the illness onset of first identified MERS case, and
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throughout the present study, we set 3 September 2015
as day zero (i.e. the date on which the initially identified
case experiences symptoms) [28]. Although a few earlier
cases were confirmed as MERS by inspecting laboratory
data a number of days after their dates of death, dates of
illness onset among deceased cases were unavailable and
had to be discarded when calculating the arrival time.
Using Fj,t, the probability that a country j has not yet
imported MERS by day t is
Sj;t ¼ 1−Fj;t: ð1Þ
The daily risk of importing MERS in country j on day
t is defined as







We parameterized the daily risk λ by examining the
statistical performance of different types of model pa-
rameterizations. In all models that we examined, we use
the so-called “effective distance”, initially proposed by
Brockmann and Helbing [29]. The metric is derived
from the airline transportation network, originally based
on itinerary data, by using the transition matrix and
length of paths between countries. The effective length




where Pji denotes the conditional probability that an in-
dividual that left i moves to j. (Note that ∑jPji = 1). As-
suming that the number of passengers is identical
among all international flights, the transition matrix is
calculated as Pji ¼ mjiX
k
mki
, where mki is the number of
direct flights from i to k per unit time derived from open
source data [25]. Finally, the effective distance mj of a
country j from Saudi Arabia is calculated as the mini-
mum of the effective lengths of all paths that go from
Saudi Arabia to the country j. The effective distance, as
calculated from the abovementioned process, has been
known to exhibit strong linear correlation with the
arrival time of SARS and H1N1-2009 across the
world [29].
Assuming that the effective distance is a critical indi-
cator of the risk of disease spread, the simplest model 1
that we examined was parameterized as
λj;t ¼ kmj ; ð5Þ
where k is a constant. Namely, the hazard is an inverse
function of the effective distance. As an alternative
model, the information of Muslim majority countries is
added, labeling corresponding countries at greater risk
as compared with other countries, because countries
sharing the religion with Saudi Arabia may be at greater
risk of exposure to cases (e.g. through Hajj). As a conse-












In models 3 and 4, we additionally use the incidence
data of MERS in Saudi Arabia over time. It is natural to
assume that the daily risk of importation is proportional
to the force of infection in Saudi Arabia, and thus, the
incidence of MERS, i.e.,
λj;t ¼ kmj It ; ð7Þ
as the model 3, where It is the incidence of MERS in
Saudi Arabia on day t. Since the original incidence data
were recorded weekly (while our model is written on the
daily basis), the weekly incidence was transformed to the
daily data assuming uniform distribution of incidences
within each week. Model 4 incorporates both of above-











Statistical estimation and assessment
To estimate model parameters, a maximum likelihood
method was employed. For the countries which have
already imported MERS by 26 June 2015, we used the
arrival time tj to fit the probability mass function of time
at which the first importation event occurs, given by the
product of λj;tj and Sj;tj . Countries that have not
imported MERS cases were dealt with as the censored
observation. The total likelihood was







where I is the set of index of countries which imported
MERS at arrival time tj and U is the set of index of
countries which are MERS-free by the date of analysis of
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26 June 2015 (tm = 1039 days after MERS onset). Assum-
ing that the dichotomous information of Muslim major-
ity country was always available, the penalized likelihood
is comparable between models 1 and 2 and also between
models 3 and 4. We calculate the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) for these comparisons [30].
Once the risk model was quantified, we assessed the
diagnostic performance of our model in predicting the
risk of importation by employing the receiver-operating
characteristic (ROC) curve and measuring the Area
under the curve (AUC) [31]. For each model, the opti-
mal cut-off value of estimated risk was calculated in pre-
dicting the importation as on tm =1039 days using the
Youden index, and sensitivity and specificity were esti-
mated. In addition, a prediction of the risk of import-
ation across countries for 3 years since the emergence
(t = 1095) was computed for illustration.
Ethical considerations
The present study reanalyzed the publicly available data
from ECDC and WHO the latter of which collected the
notification data from member state countries which
have obtained ethical approval and written consent from
patients adhering to the International Health Regula-
tions. The secondary data were de-identified by these
organizations in advance of our access. As such, the
datasets that we handled do not involve any patients’
data and the present study has been exempted from the
ethical approval.
Results
Table 1 lists the countries and their corresponding tim-
ing of MERS case importations by 26 June 2015. In total,
24 countries have experienced at least one MERS
laboratory-confirmed case importation, with the arrival
time ranging from 8 to 1015 days, with a mean of
537 days and standard deviation of 271 days. Figure 1
shows the global distribution of the effective distance
from Saudi Arabia. Middle East countries, United States
and South Korea appeared to belong to a quartile with
the shortest distance from Saudi Arabia.
Based on the arrival time information, all four models
were quantified (Table 2). The models 1 and 3 yielded
the best predictive power as measured by the AUC. In
model 2, the hazard of Muslim majority countries was
estimated to be 2.5 times (95 % confidence interval (CI):
1.1, 5.7) greater than that of other countries. Model fit
was improved by including the information of Muslim
majority countries (because of lower AIC compared to
the similar model without including religion informa-
tion), but AUC values of models with religion were
smaller than models that did not incorporate religious
majority data. Moreover, inclusion of the MERS inci-
dence data in Saudi Arabia did not improve AUC values
compared with models that do not incorporate the inci-
dence data. Sensitivity of all models was 100 % (95 % CI:
88.3, 100.0), while specificity was 79.6 % (95 % CI: 74.0,
85.2) for models without religion and 69.2 % (95 % CI:
62.8, 75.5) for models with religion.
Figure 2 shows the predicted risks of MERS import-
ation using two best models, i.e., the simplest model
with the largest AUC value (model 1) and the most de-
tailed model with good fit as informed by AIC (model
4). The distribution of predicted risk was skewed to the
right, facilitated the visual identification of countries at
high risk of experiencing MERS importation in the right
tail (Fig. 2a and b). For models 1 and 4, optimal thresh-
old probability to detect countries with importation was
estimated at 11.2 and 6.9 %, respectively. When compar-
ing the ROC curves of the two models, AUC of model 1
was greater than that of model 4, indicating that the
Table 1 Timing of documented case importations of Middle
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) around the world
Country Date of arrival Days since 3
September 2012
United Kingdom 2012/9/11 8
Germany 2012/10/24 51



















South Korea 2015/5/4 973
China 2015/5/26 995
Thailand 2015/6/15 1015
The date at which an infected individual has initially entered is shown
aFor these Middle East countries, illness onset date of first identified case was
used as the arrival date; bThere were two cases in the first instance among
which the second identified case had a history of travel to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. The second case was thus defined as the imported case
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diagnostic performance of model 4 was inferior at sev-
eral cut-off values.
Figure 3 lists the 30 countries at the highest risk of
importing MERS cases by 3 September 2015 (i.e., 3 years
since the first detection) using the abovementioned two
selected models. Among top-listed 30 countries at high-
est risk, 17 (56.7 %) have already imported at least one
MERS case in model 1 and 12 (40.0 %) have experienced
importation in model 4. The difference between two
models is understood by comparing countries in panels
A and B; panel B includes many Muslim majority coun-
tries that have not imported MERS cases. While inclu-
sion of the religion has improved the overall goodness of
fit (Table 2), AUC values and Fig. 2 demonstrate that the
inclusion did not improve the diagnostic performance of
the risk model.
Figure 4 shows the results of real-time predictions.
There has been no particular time-dependent change in
the predictive performance as measured by AUC, but
the uncertainty bound (95 % confidence intervals) of
AUC has been reduced as a function of calendar time.
Discussion
The present study devised a novel prediction model to
quantify the risk of experiencing a MERS case import-
ation for countries around the world by using data on
the arrival time of MERS cases, the global airline trans-
portation network, religion, and the incidence data in
Saudi Arabia. We have shown that the proposed model
can calculate the country-specific probability of import-
ing MERS cases, using the effective distance with or
without accounting for information on religion to clas-
sify Muslim majority countries and MERS incidence
data. The model is fairly simple compared with more so-
phisticated simulation approaches [14, 17, 18]. However,
all of the analyzed models yielded the sensitivity value of
100 % using cut-off value informed by the Youden index.
The simplest model (model 1) with effective distance
alone exhibited good predictive performance. The data
of Muslim majority countries improved goodness-of-fit
and the corresponding countries appeared to have been
significantly at an elevated risk of importation, but the
predictive performance of models 2 and 4 was lowered
compared with models 1 and 3, perhaps elevating the
risk of several Muslim majority countries that might ac-
tually be very distant from Saudi Arabia. Interestingly,
incorporating MERS incidence data into models did not
improve their diagnostic performance, although the inci-
dence was added to some of our models to increase the
precision of predicted probability of importation.
An important message of the present study is that it is
feasible to generate estimates of the risk of importation
of MERS using a simplistic and tractable approach using
the so-called effective distance as part of the hazard
function. As the International Health Regulations (IHR)
have never recommended the application of any travel
Fig. 1 Global distribution of the effective distance from Saudi Arabia. Effective distance from Saudi Arabia. Quartiles of effective distance are differentiated
by color density. Dark brown represents countries with the short distance from Saudi Arabia. Orange represents the second shortest quartile, followed by
brownish yellow and light brownish yellow. The map was drawn by the authors using statistical language R (https://cran.r-project.org/)
Table 2 Goodness-of-fit and diagnostic performance of risk models for predicting importation of the Middle East respiratory
syndrome (MERS)
ID Model Number of parameters AIC1 AUC2 Sensitivity (%) Specificity (%)
1 Effective distance only 1 464.1 0.95 (0.54,1.00) 100.0 (88.3, 100.0) 79.6 (74.0, 85.2)
2 Effective distance + religion 2 461.2 0.87 (0.46, 1.00) 100.0 (88.3, 100.0) 69.2 (62.8, 75.5)
3 Effective distance + incidence 1 357.2 0.95 (0.54, 1.00) 100.0 (88.3, 100.0) 79.6 (74.0, 85.2)
4 All pieces of information 2 354.7 0.87 (0.46, 1.00) 100.0 (88.3, 100.0) 69.2 (62.8, 75.5)
95 % confidence intervals (CI) are given in parenthesis. 1. AIC, Akaike information criterion [30]. Note that the data used for parameterizing models 1 and 2 were
different from those used for models 3 and 4, and thus, the comparison can be made only between models 1 and 2 and between models 3 and 4, respectively; 2.
AUC, area under the curve, derived from the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve [31] to predict the risk of importing a MERS case
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or trade restrictions and screening at points of entry
[32–34], countries at risk have had to confront the un-
certainty associated with the risk of experiencing a case
importation, and we believe that the devised model
could facilitate prompt risk assessment practice across
countries without the need for complex computational
approaches. Especially, since R0 for MERS is below 1
[33], which is unable to generate large-scale epidemics
in the community, with the majority of reported cases
likely arising from exposure with an animal reservoir
(i.e. dromedary camels) in Middle East countries, our
relatively simple approach may act as a good alternative
of models that rest on rich assumptions of the transmis-
sion dynamics that require more computational re-
sources. The effective distance fully rests on the airline
transportation network data and can offer a simplistic
approach to this task of prediction. As a consequence,
the model 1 correctly included 17 countries (56.6 %)
within the top 30 countries at highest risk of importa-
tions and that accounts for 70.8 % of the total 24 coun-
tries that have already documented MERS case
importations. Our model showed fairly good predictabil-
ity despite its simplicity. The only weakness that has to
be noted was the moderate value of specificity, i.e., the
proportion true negatives among the total of condition
negatives. Identifying one or more predictor variables
that could help further discriminate between true posi-
tives and false positives could be the subject of future
work. As was shown in the relative hazard estimate of
Muslim majority countries, one can also examine if a
specific group of countries is at significantly high risk of
importation compared with other countries.
Using the proposed model, public health authorities
across countries could determine where their own coun-
try stands in terms of risk relative to other countries.
While the present study used the date of analysis (26
June 2015) and 3 years since emergence (3 September
2015) as the dates of prediction, varying the time inter-
val of prediction can be easily attained. Considering that
only 24 among 225 countries (10.7 %) have experienced
at least one MERS importation, the risk estimate should
be updated as further countries may report MERS im-
portations in the future. As the absolute risk estimates
are variable by model parameters (as seen in Fig. 2), the
risk assessment practice may focus on relative risks and
model performance. Risk estimates for individual coun-
tries are available upon request.
Due to the simplicity of our approach, several limita-
tions should be explicitly mentioned. First, the probabil-
istic model essentially assumes random sampling of
Fig. 2 Predicted risk of experiencing a case importation of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). a and b Distribution of estimated risks of
importation by country based on a the risk model that used effective distance only and b model that used the effective distance as well as
religion and incidence data of MERS in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Optimal threshold probability was 11.2 % for panel A and 6.9 % for panel
b. c and d Receiver operator characteristic curves of predicted risk of importing MERS cases. Panel c shows the evaluation results of the risk
model that used effective distance only, while d shows those of the model that used the effective distance as well as religion and incidence data
of MERS in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
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infected travelers from the population of Saudi Arabia,
regardless of nationality and camel contact behavior.
While the heterogeneous factors at individual level are
highly influential in determining the risk of importation,
all mathematical models have so far not attempted to
characterize differences between traveler and non-
traveler populations. Second, our airline transportation
data was based on the country-to-country number of
flights and not the itinerary of individual travelers.
Therefore, the precision of the effective distance value
may also be limited. Nevertheless, the present study gave
more weight on the importance of devising simple yet
tractable models with the use of publicly available data.
Third, to illustrate our approach, we always used Saudi
Arabia as the country of origin, but it is worth mention-
ing that several importation events were associated with
surrounding Middle East countries including Qatar,
United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman.
Fourth, the model was country-specific, while the risk of
infection is highly heterogeneous within each country
[35–37]. Further refinements should be considered in
the future.
Despite the number of limitations noted above, it
should be stressed out that the proposed model is re-
producible by a number of countries, properly detect-
ing all countries that have already imported MERS.
We have demonstrated that it is feasible to develop
the risk model that predicts specific countries to ex-
perience importation with high sensitivity, and the
task was achieved by employing an attractive metric,
the effective distance, embedded on the hazard model
[29]. We are committed to update the model, incorp-
orating additional useful predictors and helping coun-
tries across the world to improve on their risk
assessment toolkit [38–42].
Fig. 3 Countries at high risk of case importations of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). List of the 30 countries with the estimated highest
importation risks by 3 September 2015. The panel a shows the prediction that used the effective distance only with the best predictive value as
assessed by the area under the curve (AUC; model 1). The panel b shows the prediction using a model that used the effective distance as well as
religion and incidence data of MERS in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (model 4). The model 4 yielded a smaller value of Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) as compared with the model without incorporating religion information, and was regarded as a model with good fit. Bars filled
with black are used to denote those countries that have already experienced at least one MERS importation by 26 June 2015
Fig. 4 Real-time assessment of the predictive performance of MERS
importation. Area Under the Curve (AUC) is compared as a function of
time of prediction. Two different models (i.e., effective distance only and
the model with all pieces of information) were used, and prediction was
performed every six months. Whiskers extend to lower and upper 95 %
confidence intervals
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Conclusions
We devised a novel statistical model that predicts the risk
of importation of MERS case in each country. We col-
lected the arrival time of MERS to each country, dealing
with it as a dependent variable to predict. Openly access-
ible data including the airline transportation network data
are used to parameterize a hazard-based risk prediction
model. The hazard was assumed as an inverse function of
the effective distance calculated from the airline transpor-
tation data, and religion and the incidence data of MERS
in Saudi Arabia were supplemented to improve the model
prediction.
Among the examined models, a model that uses the ef-
fective distance only was shown to yield the best predict-
ive performance. Model fit was improved by including
country-specific religion (i.e. Muslim majority country),
but predictive performance measured by AUC was not
improved by accounting for the religion. Our relatively
simple statistical model based on the effective distance
was found to help predicting the risk of importing MERS
at the country level.
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